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I. INTRODUCTION
Peter Gerhart’s new book, Property Law and Social Morality, offers
an important and original view of property.1 Gerhart weaves together
many contemporary theories into a coherent vision of property as a
locus for duties to others. More precisely, he views ownership as the
right to make decisions with regards to a resource—decisions that are
constrained by obligations owners owe to others.2 The book also offers an evolutionary account at the heart of property. Gerhart argues
that property’s origins can be found in competing claimants to a resource deciding whether to fight to acquiesce to one another’s claims.
With repeated interactions over time, a “social recognition” emerges
of the claims that others will, in general, respect. That social recognition defines the content of a community’s expectations with regards to
property. Moreover, that social recognition informs how the community, through the State, defines positive property rights, and so social
recognition and the State itself co-evolve in tandem.
The content of property rights therefore does not come from natural law, but nor is it purely positive. It is the product of the State—
and its various branches—interpreting, reflecting, and adjusting the
social recognition within the community in an iterative process. Positive property rights, in this view, are an expression of the community’s
† Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Thomas Cheeseman for
excellent research assistance in the preparation of this piece.
1. PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 1 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2014).
2. Larissa Katz made one version of this view prominent when she described
ownership as “agenda-setting authority” over a resource. See Larissa Katz, Exclusion
and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 278 (2008). Others have
explored the affirmative obligations that attend property ownership. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties
of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127 (2009): Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1255 (2007).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V2.I2.6
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interests, and are designed to ensure that property owners are sufficiently other-regarding in their decisions about how to use their property. For this reason, constitutional limits on the government’s power
to regulate property are limited only to those extreme cases where the
government acts arbitrarily (under due process analysis) or actually
eliminates property owners’ right to exclude (under the Takings
Clause).3 Regulation is part of an ongoing dialogue between the community and the State in which the topic, fundamentally, is the social
recognition of property.4
Gerhart’s book makes real contributions and nicely incorporates
doctrinal payoffs. It sells short, however, the distributional concerns
embedded in core property doctrines and so does not entirely account
for the extent to which positive law can and does diverge from social
recognition. It therefore admits constitutional protection for property
that is too parsimonious, and that also does not embrace the full complexity of the relationship between property and the State.
This short response argues that positive property rights—especially
in a modern regulatory state—are inherently redistributive. When the
State has a choice between different regulatory strategies for achieving public goals, constitutional limits like the Takings Clause should
not rely on formal categories but must instead account explicitly for
distributive concerns. At the end of the day, the State is an active, not
passive, player in the definition of property rights, a role that comes
with both constitutional limitations and requirements.
II. GERHART’S EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

OF

PROPERTY

Gerhart conceives of property as the right to make decisions regarding a resource. Those decisions, however, are not unconstrained.
Instead, they are limited by the obligations that property owners owe
to others. Specifically, Gerhart argues that a community comes to recognize the content and limits of property rights through repeated interactions. When someone claims a right to a resource, someone else
with an interest in the resource can choose to accept the other’s assertion or can contest it and fight for it. Over time, patterns in those
choices—how much to claim, whether to fight, whether to acquiesce—
ripen into norms that define a community’s expectations vis-à-vis resources in the world.5
3. GERHART, supra note 1, at 258.
4. Id. at 252 (“In the legislative realm, social values evolve from continuing conversations about the provision of public goods that cannot be provided through
private agreements and markets—goods such as environmental and historical preservation, public access to important resources, and social safety nets.”).
5. Id. at 101 (“The evolutionary path is hard to predict and will take different
turns in different communities, depending on the trade-off between violence and
norm development.”).
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This is an iterative and evolving process. For example, someone in
a proto community might claim a right to all the fruit from a tree that
he discovered. Others in his group, however, might assert their own
claims. They then face a choice: respect the others’ claims or fight
over them. Of course, the threat of violence might lead one or another to scale back his claim in order to avoid a fight. Maybe the
discoverer, instead of trying to keep all the fruit, decides to content
himself with only the fruit he can carry, leaving the rest on the tree for
the others. If no fight ensues as a result, and the same is true in repeated interactions within the community, a norm might develop that
an initial finder can claim all the fruit he or she can carry, but no
more. For Gerhart, then, social recognition is a substitute or alternative for violence; it is the product of norms that develop when people
consistently choose to acquiesce instead of fight against assertions of
rights.
The State, in this view, develops alongside property because “states
lower the cost of enforcing prevailing property norms . . . . [I]t makes
sense to institutionalize norm development through governance to
limit self-help and violence as a means of changing shared belief systems.”6 Fundamentally, the State operates as a medium for the evolution and enforcement of socially recognized rights. When the
community instantiates those rights into law, it is reflecting, at least in
a general way, the content of socially recognized rights. Sometimes
the State follows and sometimes the State leads the social recognition
of the content of property rights, but always it is roughly constrained
by the limits of what people will accept.
Gerhart’s account joins a crowded field of stylized mythologies
about the origins of private property.7 But his is a particularly elegant
one because it neatly threads the needle between natural rights theories and legal positivism. In his view, property rights and the modern
state are byproducts of repeated interactions between people; they reflect community expectations through the gradual coalescence of expectations surrounding the avoidance of violence.
There is a kind of optimistic inevitability built into Gerhart’s theory.
The co-development of property and the State occurs through dynamic interactions, but all consistent with evolutionary pressures
favoring cooperation. Initially, people avoid violence because it
makes them better off, and then rely on the State to enforce and to
develop norms, also as a substitute for violence. The resulting property norms are therefore those that the community as a whole agrees
6. See id. at 95–96.
7. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 347 (1967); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER,
FORM AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL (Michael
Oakeshott ed., Collier Press 1968) (1651).
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are better than the alternative resort to force.8 This gives a kind of
moral authority to the resulting content of positive law.
For Gerhart, then, the State develops naturally and in tandem with
social recognition because it is a more effective medium for normformation than are repeated threats of violence. He offers the hopeful suggestion that social recognition and the State co-evolve, with
each pushing the other along a similar kind of trajectory towards the
development of shared norms and expectations.
This co-evolution suggests a narrowly circumscribed role for constitutional limits on property regulation. Social recognition, whether established through individuals’ interactions in the world, or mediated
through the State, defines the limits of people’s rights with regard to
their property. And because property rights are always limited by the
obligations owners owe to non-owners and to each other, the State
can allocate the burdens and benefits of ownership in society without
taking property rights, subject only to porous limits on the police
power.
In short, people own their property subject to an evolving social
recognition of limits on ownership. This evolution is not unfettered,
but its limits are based primarily in the Due Process Clause and not
the Takings Clause.9 The Due Process Clause requires that regulatory
burdens be apportioned subject to adequate process, and that they be
imposed non-arbitrarily. But Due Process does not focus on the extent of the regulatory burden, in the sense of “going too far” under
the Penn Central test for regulatory takings.10 And in fact, Gerhart
would all but abolish regulatory takings law. The Takings Clause is
implicated only in those situations where the government has actually
eliminated a property owner’s right to exclude and has thereby supplanted and not merely regulated voluntary interactions.11
This is a kind of organic conception of the interaction between the
community and the State.
The modern State, however, is subject to its own institutional forces
separate from the evolutionary pressures within the community. Instead of a medium for developing and expressing community values,
the State may be better seen as a separate player with its own interests
and concerns. There are a number of theoretical conceptions of the
8. For an account of how people affect property norms by violating them, see
EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS (2010). For
an account of violence in the formation of community norms, see Daniel J. Sharfstein,
Atrocity, Entitlement, and Personhood, 98 VA. L. REV. 635 (2012); Stephen Clowney,
Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 ILL. L. REV.
59.
9. Other constitutional limits, like Equal Protection, also apply, but Gerhart focuses most of his analysis on the Due Process Clause.
10. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
11. GERHART, supra note 1, at 289.
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State that would propel the kind of analysis that follows here.12 For
purposes of this short essay, I do not commit to any one, but simply
observe that the individual interests of government actors, or institutional pressures on different branches of government, may generate
laws and regulations that do not track the interests or values of the
community they represent.
The divergence between community norms and positive law is well
known in the field of property in particular. Robert Ellickson’s pioneering work on the ranchers of Shasta County, for example, shows
how community norms around grazing rights can develop separately
and apart from the content of positive law.13 That divergence is also
on display in the tension between different branches of government
when it comes to property, with common law doctrines articulated by
courts at odds with legislative reforms that modify rights.14 Gerhart
may well claim that this is all just part of property’s evolution. Political participation and active litigation are simply part of the dialogue
around the evolving content of property rights. But once the State is
viewed as a separate entity, subject to its own separate evolutionary
pressures, its interactions with private property look less inevitable
and more like a contested battleground. The resulting tensions go directly to the allocation of burdens and benefits in society, and cannot
help but implicate distributive concerns. Gerhart tries to limit his theory of property to corrective justice alone, but the result is too narrowly drawn.
Following a long tradition, Gerhart defines distributive justice to include “the responsibility that the community owes to individuals . . . .
[It] is the realm of tax and social welfare law . . . .”15 Fundamentally,
it is about “the distribution of wealth, not the distribution of rights
and responsibilities with respect to wealth.”16 This is distinct from
corrective justice, which addresses “relations between individuals with
respect to resources . . . .”17 As he explains, “[c]orrective justice is
within the realm of private law, which makes decisions based on notions of corrective, interpersonal morality, not the obligations of the
12. These include, for example, civic republicanism and public choice theory,
among others. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567
(1988); James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public
Choice Theory and its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II
(James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison, eds. 1984).
13. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
14. Compare, e.g., The Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d
799, 803 (N.Y. 1996) (articulating common law Rule Against Perpetuities); with Scott
Andrew Shepard, A Uniform Perpetuities Reform Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 89, 100–01 (2013) (cataloguing perpetuities reforms).
15. GERHART, supra note 1, at 23–24.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id.
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collective.”18 Quintessentially, a conversion action implicates corrective justice; tax policy, including property tax policy, implicates distributive justice.
Gerhart acknowledges that the distinction between the two “is not
always honored in property theory . . . .”19 He is right, but the reason
may be deeper than he admits. When it comes to private law, and the
State as mediator between private parties, it is relatively easy to focus
only or at least primarily on corrective justice. But Gerhart tries to
impose a similar limit onto his treatment of public law as well, which is
much more difficult. By limiting his focus to corrective justice, Gerhart risks missing the complexity of the interaction between the community and the State, and in particular the constitutional limits on
State power.
III. SOCIAL RECOGNITION

AND THE

TAKINGS CLAUSE

According to Gerhart, existing “regulatory takings doctrine is pernicious precisely because it asserts the function of the state is to protect
the value of property rather than protect the right to see value from
property.”20 Constitutional limits on the allocation of burdens and
benefits should be confined to due process. Gerhart would apply the
Takings Clause only when the State has expropriated the owner’s right
to exclude (which it may only do when the market cannot produce a
particular social good).21 The difference is conceptual, but the stakes
are very real, because due process violations generally invalidate the
government action, while takings violations result only in
compensation.
Traditionally, and even sometimes still today, courts have distinguished between regulations on the one hand and takings on the
other. They reason that a regulation is permissible, but a taking is
not.22 For these courts, the ultimate question is one of classification:
which of these two categories does a particular action fall within?
Gerhart’s analysis is reminiscent of this approach. He claims that the
distinction between eminent domain and a regulation is simply
18. Id. at 23.
19. Id. at 22.
20. GERHART, supra note 1, at 267.
21. Id. at 286–87 (“A prerequisite to market coordination of private decisions is
that private owners have the right to exclude others. Without the right to exclude the
market does not function. When the market is not serving its coordinating function
and needs to be replaced with another method of coordinating decisions about resources (which is the function of the takings power), it is the right to exclude that
must be taken because taking the right to exclude allows the state to coordinate uses
in a way that mimics a well-functioning market.”).
22. Cf. e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 70 (1986) (“[T]he outer limit of the police power has traditionally marked
the line between noncompensable regulation and compensable takings of property,
not the line between compensable takings and the area where the constitution bars
government from engaging in any sort of exchange whatever.”).
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whether or not the government has taken the right to exclude.23 That,
he says, is the dividing line between usurping the property owner’s
rights to make decisions regarding the property, and not.24
For Gerhart, the Takings Clause is, in a sense, outside of the definition of property. It polices the outer boundary of property, delimiting
when it is no longer private. But the Takings Clause should be seen as
internal to the definition of property. It applies to rebalance the burdens of ownership, not only when ownership is supplanted by the
State, but also when its associated burdens and benefits are unduly
distorted by the State. Instead of a constraint on those regulations
that are tantamount to expropriation, the Takings Clause reflects a
compromise that protects some property owners from the most extreme costs and consequences of beneficial legal change.25 It is actually a middle ground, allowing the government to regulate and the
legal change to occur, but requiring compensation if the results are
too burdensome. While the State may reasonably disagree with property owners about the applicability of the Takings Clause in specific
cases, the overall nature of the protection as facilitating legal change
can be embraced by the regulator as well as by the regulated. In other
words, the Takings Clause can actually facilitate the evolution of property norms. Extending Gerhart’s own evolutionary account reveals
the important role that takings protection can play.
Gerhart describes social recognition evolving with assertions of
rights that are modified over repeated interactions. Someone may
claim an entire orchard but, when challenged, retreat to a claim to a
particular tree, or even just a single apple.26 The same can be true of
positive rights, too. Recall, pace Gerhart, that the State and state actors have incentives that are distinct from the community’s. Therefore, the State’s preferred outcome—and first attempt—may simply
be to rule by fiat. Faced with rebellion or political opposition, the
State might be forced to moderate its assertion of power, either by
withdrawing its assertion of power, or promising to compensate instead. Where offered, the promise of compensation can be seen as a
compromise position by the State to make palatable those restrictions
23. GERHART, supra note 1, at 287 (“[R]egulations that take away the right to
exclude are takings.”).
24. Id. Gerhart acknowledges that some regulations have the same effect and
thinks the Takings Clause should apply there too, but regulatory takings doctrine traditionally goes much further than this, and Gerhart rejects that extension. He would
limit regulatory takings doctrine only to those cases that amount to permanent physical occupations.
25. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect
Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 349 (2014) (“The compensation requirement for regulatory takings serves to protect property owners from the effects of legal
transitions . . . .”).
26. GERHART, supra note 1, at 93–94 (“The claim may not be to an apple; the
person who picks an apple may, by virtue of that act, claim the entire apple orchard or
all the apples in the world . . . .”).
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or controls that would otherwise generate too much opposition.27 The
Takings Clause embodies this compromise; it is a political precommitment to pay compensation for exertions of regulatory power that
would otherwise be unacceptable. This is not a novel theory. Frank
Michelman’s account of demoralization costs is remarkably similar, although he uses a different vocabulary.28 The State must pay when the
costs of not doing so are too high.
This conception of the Takings Clause, however, cannot be implemented without attending specifically to concerns of distributive justice. It is about offering a compromise specifically when regulatory
burdens are perceived as unfair or unjust. The Takings Clause is
therefore intimately bound up with distributive justice. One of the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements about takings liability is as insightful as it is vague: The Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”29 As Hanoch Dagan recognized, “This statement places the
Aristotelian notion of distributive justice—which requires that recipients of benefits and burdens receive their share according to some
criterion—at the heart of takings jurisprudence.”30
Recognizing the State’s interventions in property as redistributive
makes it easy to see that such redistribution can happen in one of two
ways. It can happen either through the explicit expropriation of property from some people to give to others, as in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.31 But it can, and usually does, happen through the
redefinition of property rights. Three examples demonstrate this
point clearly, the first focusing on the distributive aspects of the line
between due process and takings; the second on the distributive aspects of the line between regulatory takings and eminent domain; and
the last on the distinction between institutional actors. All make the
point that Gerhart’s narrow role for the Takings Clause fails to account for contexts in which the Takings Clause is an important limitation on state power.
The first is the zoning of prior non-conforming uses.32 Gerhart himself points to this issue as an example of the due process limits on
27. This is an apt if overly simplified description of the origins of the United
States, and its break with England. Dissatisfied with the property regime in England,
and the King’s continued control over property in America, the American Revolution
redefined the scope of governmental authority over property, and wrote new restrictions into the Constitution.
28. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility & Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
29. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
30. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 742
(1999).
31. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
32. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222 (2009) (for a comprehensive examination of the problem).
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retroactive legislation. Indeed, if a government attempts to regulate
retroactively, the effect is “adjudicating claims based on past events”
which “violates due process.”33 This is entirely consistent with basic
intuitions, especially when it comes to criminal law (as reflected in the
ex post facto clause), torts, and some common law property doctrines.
But the line between prospective and retroactive regulation in the
context of public land use regulation—Gerhart’s quintessential example of public regulation—turns out to be much more complex, as I
have argued in previous work.34 The problem, fundamentally, is that
every land use regulation has a retroactive effect. As Holly Doremus
has pointed out, “new property rules can never be wholly forwardlooking,” because while “they can be applied only to new activities,
they can never be applied to new land.”35
Consider, then, a land use regulation that eliminates an existing use
of property—for example a new zoning rule that prohibits adult uses
in a particular zone, and does not grandfather existing uses. That ordinance is not retroactive in the strong sense because it only requires
compliance with the law going forward. It does not impose penalties
or fines based on the prior existing use in the past. The ordinance has
a retroactive effect, however, because it interferes prospectively with
the property owner’s past decisions—i.e. the choice to build the adult
use in the first place. But all land use regulations have such an effect
to a greater or lesser degree. If someone buys farmland planning to
develop a subdivision, and a zoning change downzones the property to
agricultural use only before the subdivision occurs, she will also experience the zoning change as having a retroactive effect.36
For purposes of the argument here, the problem is not just that the
boundary line between prospective and retroactive land use regulations is difficult to draw. The problem is that the boundary should not
be policed exclusively by due process analysis. It may well be that a
regulation requiring the immediate cessation of a use is important,
and creates significant public benefits that outweigh the burden to the
property owner. The regulation is thus rationally related to a legitimate and even important government purpose and so satisfies due
process. But that should not necessarily end the analysis because of
the extent of the burden on the property owner. The real question
here is not whether the government should be able to act. It should, if
eliminating the existing use really benefits society more than it harms
the burdened property owner. The real question is whether the government should have to compensate for the impact of its regulation.
33. GERHART, supra note 1, at 300.
34. See Serkin, supra note 32, at 1262–63.
35. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1,
11–12 (2003).
36. See Serkin, supra note 32, at 1264.
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Under Gerhart’s account, the answer is simple: No. The regulation
does not eliminate the right to exclude. It is “merely” a land use regulation. And under due process analysis, it is a permissible one. This
example, though, demonstrates the challenges of Gerhart’s stingy
view of the Takings Clause. In at least some cases, the government
should be allowed to eliminate a prior non-conforming use, but should
have to pay compensation to do so.37 Deciding precisely when and in
what circumstances the government must pay compensation in such a
case depends on particular distributive commitments. Formalistic
line-drawing between due process and takings will not answer the
question.
The line between eminent domain and regulatory takings also implicates distributive justice. Consider, in this regard, a developer seeking to build a significant new building in New York City, or other
major metropolitan area. There may be corrective-justice limits on
the developer’s right to build. For example, the developer cannot
build in a way that causes subsidence of neighbors’ property. The new
building also may not be allowed to interfere with existing buildings’
light and air. In fact, it is not too much of a stretch to see most of the
content of a traditional zoning ordinance as reflecting basic limitations
on property rights based on social recognition and, ultimately, corrective justice as Gerhart defines them. This all fits nicely in Gerhart’s
account.
Other requirements, however, do not. Inclusionary zoning, for example, can require developers to provide affordable housing. Exactions in various forms may require set asides for open space,
infrastructure development, and even outright payments for school
costs and so forth. These affirmative obligations are often built directly into the zoning ordinance defining the rights of the property
owner, and they are squarely redistributive. They are not concerned
with the reciprocal interactions between neighboring property owners,
but instead are about the allocation of benefits and burdens in society
more generally.
These kinds of zoning interventions can actually be substitutes for
an explicit exercise of eminent domain. A government seeking to provide affordable housing that the market is failing to produce has a
number of strategies to pursue. It can take property by eminent domain and build public housing, or it can leave property in private
hands but demand the private production of affordable housing as a
precondition for other development. For Gerhart, these regulations
do not eliminate the right to exclude and so are not subject to takings
analysis. That, however, is an uncomfortable result. It is again easy
enough to envision regulatory burdens that satisfy due process but
37. See id. at 1288 (“The normative justifications for current existing use protection are surprisingly unconvincing.”).
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that nevertheless impose substantial burdens and are, in effect, substitutes for eminent domain.
Admittedly, Gerhart attempts to caveat out exactions from his takings analysis.38 He may extend that qualification to inclusionary zoning, special assessments, and other explicit demands that the
government makes of property owners. But this starts to swallow up
an enormous swath of modern land use controls.
I am generally sympathetic to the normative goal of limiting regulatory takings doctrine. I agree that the State has, and should have,
broad power to regulate. But this particular line-drawing seems
overly formalistic, especially once one accepts the extent of redistribution that happens through the State’s interaction with property. And
it is impossible to decide the limits of the government’s power to demand obligations from property owners without invoking explicitly
distributive concerns.
Importantly, positive property rights implicate distributive justice
even when the source of the rights is judicial and not legislative. The
Takings Clause is most associated with regulatory burdens, but the
source of beneficial legal changes can also be judge-made law, and the
analysis is surprisingly similar. The bourgeoning literature on judicial
takings—or is it a flash in the pan?—makes this point directly.39 And
an example is useful.
In the 1970s, two sugar companies in Hawaii were in litigation over
water rights.40 Each claimed a right to water from a river. The suit
wound its way up to the state Supreme Court, which ruled, sua sponte,
that the water did not belong to either company but instead belonged
to the people of Hawaii.41 The two sugar companies immediately
joined sides and filed suit in federal district court alleging that the
state court’s opinion amounted to a taking of their property. After
various procedural moves, and an eventual clarification by the state
Supreme Court, the suit was ultimately dismissed. But it points to an
important concept. Had the case proceeded, there is no obvious reason why the federal courts’ response should have been limited to the
binary choice under due process of either accepting the state court’s
conclusion, or striking it down.
The state court’s ruling squarely implicated distributive justice, effectively allocating important resources between private companies
and the public. And it may well have effectuated a change in people’s
38. GERHART, supra note 1, at 260 (“I do not challenge (or discuss) the exactions
cases”).
39. See, e.g., Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 553 (2012).
40. Williamson B. C. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts “Take”
Property?, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 57 (1979–1981).
41. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp 559, 563 (D. Haw. 1977), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
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background expectations. But that change might have been simultaneously beneficial to society, and unfairly burdensome to the affected
companies. If a federal court had struck down the ruling under Due
Process, it might have been unfair to the public, and indeed might
have prevented an important evolution in the law. But if it upheld the
ruling, it could have worked a serious and unfair burden to the property owners. It is at least possible that a compensation remedy under
the Takings Clause provides a beneficial alternative remedy, one that
allows the evolution in property law but serves the interests of distributive justice.42 Whether or not that would have been an appealing
remedy in this particular case, this discussion reinforces a more general point: positive definitions of property rights implicate distributive
concerns that can be best addressed through the Takings Clause,
whether the source of the definition is regulation or judge-made law.
Finally, the Takings Clause can exert pressure in the opposite direction as well. Gerhart’s exceedingly narrow role for regulatory takings
doctrine is at least in tension with his theory of a duty to others arising
out of decision-making. In the private sphere, Gerhart offers a subtle
account of other-regarding decisions, compelling property owners to
consider the interests of other people when their decisions have an
impact on others’ wellbeing. This is a remarkably tort-like view of
property, but also nicely accounts for a number of thorny cases and
property doctrines.43
It is not clear, however, why this is limited to private decision-making. Gerhart says: “In private law, courts assess individuals’ decisions
about resources by comparing an individual’s behavior with the behavior of an ideal decision maker and correcting those behaviors that
do not seem to embody an appropriate way of thinking about the
well-being of others.”44 That same reasoning could apply to decisions
by the State. Just as private decision makers can fail to account for
the consequences of their actions to others, so too can the State fail to
address the appropriate allocation of burdens and benefits resulting
from its property regulations.
Gerhart rejects extending this reasoning to the State because he ultimately adopts a relatively passive role for the State in its interaction
with property. Recognizing how intimately the State’s interaction
with private property is bound up with distributive justice, however,
makes this passive role harder to defend.
Once the State acts to define the content of property rights on
grounds of distributive justice—whether through regulations or otherwise45—the State cannot assume the role of passive enforcer of pri42. Bloom & Serkin, supra note 39, at 615–16.
43. GERHART, supra note 1, at 287.
44. Id. at 47.
45. See generally Bloom & Serkin, supra note 39 (applying the Takings Clause to
judicial decisions).
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vate rights. It is intimately bound up in the content of those rights, the
justifications for which are always evolving. In our fast-paced world, a
regulation that was justifiable on distributive justice grounds when enacted can become unjustifiable as conditions in the world change.
Limiting property regulation to concerns of corrective justice, and limiting regulatory takings doctrine to a narrow set of permanent physical
occupations, sells short the extent to which the State is and should be
entangled with the substantive content of property, and its distributional consequences.
Extending Gerhart’s focus on the duties arising out of decision
making to the State has important doctrinal consequences, as well as
these more conceptual and normative ones. Traditional regulatory
takings analysis focuses almost exclusively on the effect of regulations
and governmental acts on property value. But this is problematic because it makes the government potentially liable only for government
actions and not for government inaction. In a new article, I argue that
the government can—under certain limited conditions—violate the
Takings Clause by failing to act to protect property. I do not need to
rehearse the full argument here, but I justify my claim on several
grounds. First, from an efficiency perspective, takings liability that applies only to government actions creates an incentive for the government to do nothing. Second, from a distributive perspective, the
ultimate allocation of burdens and benefits in society can result from
withholding regulatory benefits from some as surely as it can from
imposing regulatory burdens on to others. In Michelman’s terms,
“Governmental inaction can be demoralizing, too.”46
This is admittedly an unorthodox account of the Takings Clause,
both doctrinally and normatively. But Gerhart’s theory of property
should offer additional support. Once the state is viewed as something separate from the community—subject to its own evolutionary
pressures, as I argued above—its interactions with property owners
can produce the same expectations over time as owners’ interactions
with each other. Just as repeated interactions over time can produce
affirmative obligations on owners to each other, it can also plausibly
produce affirmative obligations on the State. And applied to the
State, recognizing such a duty can have important progressive effects,
from discouraging the government to ignore the risks of sea level rise,
to encouraging the government to respond to various systemic threats
to property. But the principal mechanism for enforcing that obligation is the Takings Clause. In other words, Gerhart’s evolutionary account of property should support affirmative obligations on the state,
but is in real tension with his thin view of constitutional rights.
Whatever one’s view of the substance of regulatory claims based on
governmental inaction, the more general point is the more important
46. Serkin, supra note 25 at 366.
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one here: Gerhart recognizes a largely passive role for the State. This
does not sufficiently recognize the broad range of responsibilities that
the State properly owes to the public, responsibilities that are sometimes required by the Takings Clause, although not according to
Gerhart.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gerhart has written an important and subtle book. His evolutionary account of property, and his focus on decision-making is bound to
have a lasting impact. His ability to demonstrate coherence in a broad
range of property doctrines is a testament to the persuasiveness of his
approach. Extending his evolutionary account to the political realm,
and to the recognition of property rights by the State, enriches our
understanding of positive rights. But it also reveals limits to his analysis of the State’s interaction with property. Recognizing that distributive justice concerns are at the heart of property’s evolution within the
State suggests that the State has an active role in allocating the burdens and benefits of property ownership, a role that it can abuse
through regulatory excess or through inaction.

